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Abstract
Human intelligence is redefined in light of new evidence that, in addition to general intelligence,
broad mental abilities exist such as quantitative, spatial, and verbal-comprehension intelligences.
Many of these broad intelligences pertain to circumscribed topics; that is, to reasoning within a
broad content-area. For example, quantitative intelligence is concerned with mathematical
reasoning, and spatial intelligence with reasoning about objects and their shapes and movements.
Some among the broad intelligences are focused on reasoning about people: People-focused
intelligences include personal intelligence (an intelligence about personality), social intelligence,
and emotional intelligence. I argue for an understanding of each broad intelligence as involving a
group of abilities necessary to reason about a specific subject area. To help organize the broad
intelligences, a rationale is provided for categorizing them according to whether they focus
mostly on things or on people.
Key Words: Intelligence, intelligence testing, personal intelligence, people-thing, emotional
intelligence, social intelligence
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Intelligences about Things and Intelligences about People
In 1994, Linda Gottfredson, a professor at the University of Delaware, authored an
editorial directed toward the educated public entitled “Mainstream science in intelligence,” that
was cosigned by 52 eminent intelligence researchers. Gottfredson sought to address what she and
others regarded as mischaractizations of intelligence research that had appeared in media
accounts. Her piece appeared in the Wall Street Journal, and was subsequently reprinted in the
journal Intelligence (Gottfredson, 1997). What is of particular interest here are not any missteps
of the media at that time but, given the consensual nature of the document, the opening definition
of intelligence. Intelligence is, Gottfredson explained:
“…a very general mental capability that, among other things, involves
the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex
ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience…[I]t reflects a…capability for
comprehending our surroundings—‘catching on,’ ‘making sense’ of things, or
‘figuring out’ what to do.” (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 13)
This already very good definition can be further sharpened, I believe, by acknowledging
that intelligence has evolved to help people adapt to and survive in their environments.
This evolutionary perspective encourages our consideration of intelligence’s role in
people’s understanding of their surrounding world. Shaped that way, I would describe
intelligence as:
“A person’s mental capacity to solve problems that concern the inner self and
surrounding world. The capabilities include the ability to represent information
relevant to specific topics and contexts accurately in memory and to manipulate
that information systematically. The ability further involves identifying the
similarities and differences among concepts and contexts, ‘getting the point’ and
drawing upon appropriate generalizations so as to relate existing information to
new problems; it involves ‘figuring things out,’ with the purpose of finding
effective solutions.
Gottfredson’s definition employs the opening phrase, “a very general mental capability…”,
placing an emphasis on general intelligence. Although I agree people possess a general capacity
to problem-solve, I also believe they specialize in particular areas of problem solving—
especially by adulthood (Ackerman, 2014). For that reason, I have added the idea that the
information relates to “particular topics and contexts” relevant to the person—a modification
designed to allow for more than one area of intelligence.
Although a theoretical model of intelligence that emphasizes general problem solving fits
contemporary data adequately, there is increasing consensus that taking account of a group of
differentiated “broad intelligences,” such as verbal-comprehension intelligence, perceptualorganizational reasoning, mental speededness, and other qualities can enhance our representation
of human intellectual performance beyond global reasoning alone.
A Note on General Intelligence and Broad Intelligences
Charles Spearman (1904) had first observed that people’s abilities correlated positively
with one another across a diverse group of intellectual problems: As a person’s ability on one
task rose, so it did on other tasks. This positive manifold, as the positive correlations became
known, was a ubiquitous finding. If all human intellectual abilities rose and fell together,
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Spearman argued, perhaps they could be represented as just one overall general intelligence.
Spearman’s observation that mental abilities all correlated positively was supported by
subsequent research. The correlations among abilities, however, were not all at the same level.
Without getting too far into the technical details, I’ll observe that there existed subsets of tasks
that correlated more highly with one another than with other subsets of tasks. The positive
manifold, in other words, was not equally present across all abilities, and the statistical grey areas
provided potential evidence for subgroups of intelligences (multiple intelligences) as well as a
general one. The next 70 or so years were marked by a lively debate over whether human
intelligence was best regarded as one or multiple in nature (see, for example, Gardner, 1983;
Gignac & Weiss, 2015; Jensen, 1998; Sternberg, 1985; Van et al., 2006; Visser, Ashton, &
Vernon, 2006).
In the 1970s, mathematical psychologists introduced a new tool called structural equation
modeling (SEM) for modeling correlations in the field. SEM allowed for statistical tests of which
theoretical representations of intelligence fit correlational data best (e.g., Joreskog, 1969; Kenny,
1976; Thompson, 2004). John Carroll (1993) assembled hundreds of findings from intelligence
tests over the 20th century and applied SEM to his combined data set. He concluded that
intelligences could be organized into three-strata (levels): his three-stratum model (also referred
to as the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model), describes a hierarchy of mental abilities in which general
intelligence is positioned at the top, rather like the CEO at the top of a corporate organizational
chart, beneath which are a series of ten to fifteen broad intelligences, analogous to the corporate
chief officers responsible for the financial, information technology, human relations, and other
functions of the organization. Examples of these broad intelligences include the perceptualorganizational, spatial, and verbal intelligences (Flanagan, McGrew, & Ortiz, 2000; Schneider &
Newman, 2015). Carroll placed still more specific abilities at the third, lowest level of the
hierarchy—analogous to the distinct individuals who run smaller departments of the
organization. For example, vocabulary knowledge is part of verbal-propositional intelligence
(McGrew, 2009).
Many of the broad intelligences relate to specific subject or topic areas: People use their
perceptual-organizational intelligence to understand how to fit objects together, such as the parts
of an engine. People use their spatial intelligence to recognize objects and understand how they
would appear from different angles, and to throw balls, rocks, and spear-like projectiles along
particular trajectories. People employ quantitative intelligence to solve mathematical problems.
Other broad intelligences concern memory retrieval and working memory span and play more
basic, foundational roles in thinking.
Today there is considerable evidence that these broad, interrelated intelligences exist
subsidiary to general reasoning ability (Flanagan, Alfonso, Ortiz, & Dynda, 2013; Schneider &
Newman, 2015; Sternberg & Hedlund, 2002; Sternberg & Project, 2009; Visser et al., 2006). I
would argue, however, that the Carroll model of 1993 and models since have examined a diverse
but nonetheless incomplete set of intelligences.
A Startling Omission
The problem with the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model of 1993 (and other models of the time)
was that, integrative as it was, it nonetheless omitted key areas of intelligence. The broad
intelligences focused more-or-less exclusively on reasoning about things: puzzle pieces (the
perceptual-organizational), objects in space (spatial), quantitative (numbers), even the “things”
that are the words and sentences we use (verbal), although words and sentences also include
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thinking about people. This reflected the more general thing-orientation of academic psychology
at the time.
A second example of this thing-oriented focus was the classical approach to primate
cognition of the mid-20th century: Comparative psychologists, who were studying chimpanzees’
and bonobos’ intellect, chiefly focused on their “understanding of objects and their various
spatial, causal, and featural interrelations” (Tomasello & Call, 1997, p. 25). Psychologists
viewed chimpanzees and bonobos as mostly preoccupied with foraging for food: mapping the
world around them, finding shortcuts to the food, and predicting where food would next appear
(Tomasello & Call, 1997). These non-human primates could indeed categorize objects,
understand the objects as permanent (in the Piagetian sense), rotate objects in their minds, and
count small numbers of objects—mental abilities that paralleled such human intelligences as the
perceptual-organizational, the spatial and the quantitative.
Reasoning about Individuals?
Over time, however, comparative psychologists realized that our nearest primate relatives
not only reasoned about things but also about one another, although the researchers were
“somewhat slow to recognize this fact” (Tomasello & Call, 1997, p. 187). Non-human primates,
it turned out, also strove to assess other individuals’ intentions, to learn from them, and
ultimately to predict other individuals’ behaviors as best they could. Tomasello and Call
observed:
“Because primates individually recognize many of the members of their social
groups, they come to know…the…behavioral tendencies of specific individuals,
both toward themselves and toward one another making for a highly complex
“social field” in which virtually every decision made must take account of…the
social relationships of virtually all the individuals present.” (1997, p. 187)
Intelligences about People
Although academic psychologists mostly focused on reasoning about things, there were
exceptions: Edward L. Thorndike (1920) had proposed a social intelligence: “an ability to
understand and manage men and women, boys and girls, to act wisely in human relations.” A
first ability-based measure of social intelligence was developed (Hunt, 1928), but sophisticated
reviewers regarded its test scores as insufficiently distinct from general IQ to demonstrate the
existence of a new mental ability (R. L. Thorndike & Stein, 1937). Twenty-three years later, Lee
J. Cronbach concurred that “…social intelligence remain[ed] undefined and unmeasured”
(Cronbach, 1960, p. 319). And still today, strong evidence for an independent social intelligence
remains elusive (e.g., Conzelmann, Weis, & Süß, 2013).
But alternative concepts fared better: In 1990, Peter Salovey and I introduced the idea of
an “emotional intelligence”—an ability to reason about emotions (Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey,
1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), which drew on precursor ideas including those of social
intelligence and Gardner’s (1983) theory of multiple intelligences. In 2008, I introduced personal
intelligence, described as the capacity to understand personality in oneself and others (Mayer,
2008). Personal intelligence drew together areas of reasoning described in such precursor
concepts as psychological mindedness (Appelbaum, 1973) and the good judge of people (Funder,
2001), and involved an explicit rationale for the existence of a unitary reasoning process about
personality (Mayer, 2009; Mayer, 2014).
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At the time of Carroll’s three-stratum model, the idea of any intelligence focused on
personality, or on people’s emotions, seemed a poor fit with the more thing-focused intelligences
of the day. Initially, many psychologists rejected the possibility that an emotional intelligence
might exist (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Locke, 2005). Although I will focus on
emotional and personal intelligences here, there are other possible members of the group
including practical intelligence (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985; Wagner, 2000), spiritual
intelligence (Emmons, 2000), and the aforementioned social intelligence (Conzelmann et al.,
2013; Weis & Süß, 2007; Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995).
Measuring People-Centered Intelligences
The Test Development Process
The most direct evidence for intelligences about people come from empirical research
based on the ability-based theories of emotional and personal intelligences: If a reliable measure
of a well-defined psychological variable can be developed, and its validity demonstrated, the
existence of the variable is supported (Cacioppo, Semin, & Berntson, 2004; Haig, 2005). In our
laboratory, we have been involved in a program of test development and improvement around
both the emotional and personal intelligences (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2016). For both
intelligences, we have engaged in a multiple-step process of test development (see Figure 1),
centered around the principle that these intelligences can be assessed as mental abilities (Mayer
et al., 2016).
Figure 1. Initial processes involved in developing an intelligence test

Step 1. Specify the
problem-solving
area

Step 2. Specify the
symbols, units, and
operators of the
intelligence

Step 3. Formulate
the test and
compose items

Step 4. Examine test
characteristics and
revise where
needed

In the first stage of test development, we define the intelligence in part by specifying its
problem-solving domain (Figure 1, left-hand box). For example, personal intelligence is focused
on reasoning about personality-related information; emotional intelligence is concerned with
reasoning about emotions and emotion-related information (brief definitions are shown in Table
1 (Row 1). Specifying the relevant areas of problem-solving content helps to define both areas of
intelligence and to distinguish them from other similar areas of reasoning. The four areas of
reasoning for personal intelligence shown in Table 1 involve identifying personality-relevant
information, forming models of personality, guiding personal choices, and systematizing
personal plans (Table 1, Row 2).

INTELLIGENCES ABOUT THINGS AND PEOPLE 6

Table 1
A Brief Overview of Emotional and Personal Intelligences and their Measurement
Emotional Intelligence
Personal Intelligence
Brief definition
The ability to reason validly with
The ability to reason about
emotions and with emotion-related personality—both our own and the
information, and to use
personalities of others—including
emotions to enhance thought.*
about motives and emotions,
thoughts and knowledge, plans and
styles of action, and awareness and
self-control.*
Areas of
(a) Perceiving emotions, (b) using
(a) Identifying personality-relevant
reasoning
emotion to facilitate thought, (c)
information, (b) forming models of
understanding emotions, (d)
personality, (c) guiding choices with
managing emotions
personality-relevant information, (d)
systematizing plans.
Ability test
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional
Test of Personal Intelligence 1.2
description
Intelligence Test (Mayer, Salovey,
(Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2012)
& Caruso, 2002); see also MacCann
and Roberts (2008) for an
alternative
Sample test item If a person feels more and more
If a person is outgoing and talkative,
frustrated over time, and thinks he
most likely, she is also inclined to
has been treated unfairly, the person be:
may become:
a. self-controlled
a. regretful
b. willing to take more risks than
b. angry
average
c. guilty
c. anxious and impulsive
d. happy
d. fairly thick-skinned
*from Mayer, Caruso & Salovey, 2016, p. 7
We next describe the informational building blocks, termed the conceptual units, people
reason about in the area (Figure 2, second box), as well as the mental processes they apply to
those units. For personal intelligence, one type of unit is the “mental trait,” including instances
such as extraversion and verbal intelligence. Then we consider possible operators—clearly
specified procedures of reasoning—used with those units (cf., Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958, p
152; Newell & Simon, 1972). For example, one key operator relevant to traits is the “go
together” operator: If person X is dutiful, then person X is also likely to be self-disciplined and
cautious according to several models that examine hierarchies of personality traits (DeYoung,
Quilty, & Peterson, 2007; Goldberg, 1993).
Dynamic pairs (DPs) are pairs of personality parts or aspects of personality that, relative
to society, may cause the personality system conflict, owing to the inner or social conflicts they
may elicit. A dynamic pair that leads to social conflict is the trait of disagreeableness in social
relationships: A person with disagreeableness exerts considerable effort to disagree with others
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rather than going along with a crowd. In addition, disagreeable people are often shunned,
potentially reducing their well-being (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
Dynamic pairs of traits or goals sometimes may cause inner conflict. A person who is
both anxious and sensation-seeking will simultaneously crave risk and be fearful of the
consequences their daring acts may entail. As a second example, a person whose goals include
“being honest all the time” but who also hopes “to appear better in public than I really am” will
face some difficult decisions regarding his or her aspirations (Emmons & King, 1988). Dynamic
pairs also emerge from misrepresentations of the self, for example, if people’s erroneous beliefs
as to who they are causes friction with how others see them. A narcissistic individual may
believe he is cool whereas others perceive him as exploitative—and this ultimately can lead to
negative social consequences for the individual such as impaired work performance (Oltmanns &
Turkheimer, 2006).
In the third step of our test development (Figure 2, Step 3) we formulate test questions
that pertain to the subject area and concern the units and operators described above. Table 1
(Row 3) provides references for the specific tests we and a few others have developed in the area
along with some sample test items, for example, the Test of Personal Intelligence or TOPI. That
measure includes items such as this:
If a person is outgoing and talkative, most likely, she is also inclined to be:
a. self-controlled
b. more assertive than average
c. anxious and impulsive
d. altruistic
The correct answer here is “b. more assertive than average,” because research on the big five
personality traits indicate that talkativeness and sociability are more highly correlated with
assertiveness than with the other listed alternatives.
Although both personal and emotional intelligences concern people, they are
substantially different in their subject areas. It is possible, for example, to write a hundred test
items in the area of personal intelligence without much mention of emotions. Similarly, it is
possible to write a hundred questions about emotions without asking anything much about
personality traits or other information about personality. In Step 4, we administer test items to
people to evaluate whether the intelligence exists, and simultaneously, the quality of our test
items and test. Our theory of personal intelligence predicts that people who recognize
personality-relevant units and their interactions will score higher on our test of personal
intelligence than other people.
Personal and Emotional Intelligences as a Broad Intelligences within the Three-Stratum
Model
Findings from personal and emotional intelligence tests indicate that each one samples a
broad range of problems solving, and each individually assesses a reliable individual-difference
variable (reliabilities typically in the r = .80 to .90 range for the overall tests), that is largely
unitary. (How each intelligence might be best subdivided remains unsettled). MacCann and
colleagues reported the results from a large-scale study funded by the United States Army
Research Institute and Educational Testing Services. Their findings indicated that emotional
intelligence, represented as three factors of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence
Test (MSCEIT), fit well within the broad-intelligence stratum of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model
(MacCann, Joseph, Newman, & Roberts, 2014). A reanalysis of the same data by Legree and
colleagues reached the same conclusion regarding the MSCEIT’s fit within the three-stratum
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model, but represented all portions of the test as a single factor (Legree et al., 2014). (For a more
detailed discussion of its indeterminate factor structure, see Mayer et al., 2016).
Personal intelligence, the newer construct, has not yet been tested in such a large-scale
study, but it exhibits the same positive manifold with other broad intelligences suggestive of a
broad intelligence. Personal intelligence may also divide into two subsidiary factors that
correlate about r = .80 with one another (Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2014). The first factor
involves perceiving consistencies in people’s behaviors. The second factor represents reasoning
about personality dynamics, such has how goals interrelate, and how multiple observers each
may perceive the same person differently.
Thing-Centered versus People-Centered Intellectual Development
People vary in their interest in things versus people beginning as early as the third grade.
To ask yourself which you are most interested in, decide whether you most like to “…to stop to
watch a machine working on the street?” or “to make the first attempt to meet a new neighbor?”
(Graziano, Habashi, Evangelou, & Ngambeki, 2012, p. 468). Intellectual development may be
guided by these interests. William Skimmyhorn and I were able to model course performance at
the United States Military Academy at West Point largely by dividing course grades into a GPA
for thing-related courses such as engineering, math and science, on the one hand, and peoplerelated courses such as literature, philosophy, and environmental and social sciences on the other
(Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017). Occupations, too, are often distinguished by whether they are
thing- or people-oriented: Compare accounting, clerical, engineering and research work, on the
one hand, to sales, social services, and interior decorating on the other (Holland, 1966). Interest
in the two general areas may in turn encourage a person to develop thing- or person-centered
intelligences over adulthood (von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013).
Specificity of Prediction?
Correlates and Predictions
A number of findings distinguish people- from thing-focused broad intelligences. First,
within the generally positive correlations among broad intelligences, the more specifically thingoriented an intelligence is, the lower its correlation with people-centered intelligences. For
example, personal intelligence correlates just r = .17 and r = .20 with SAT-Math and spatial
intelligence measures, but rises to r = .39 with verbal intelligence (which presumably is mid-way
between thing- and person-focused), and rises again to r = .53 with the the Reading the Mind in
the Eyes scale, a measure of understanding people, and exhibits an r = .69 with the MSCEIT
understanding emotions and managing emotions areas (the latter, managing emotion area,
arguably blends somewhat into personal intelligence at a conceptual level).
Second, most intelligences correlate with the openness dimension of the Big Five at about
the r = .20 level, but people-focused intelligences, compared to thing-focused intelligences,
exhibit a unique pattern of correlations with the Big Five personality traits beyond that.
Individuals who are better able to reason about themselves and others are also able to interact
with others more smoothly and their self-understanding may lead to better control. Both personal
and emotional intelligences, it turns out, also correlate with higher levels of agreeableness and
conscientiousness (an index of self-control) than thing-focused intelligences (DeYoung, 2011;
Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017; Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2012).
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Specificity of Course Performance. Mayer and Skimmyhorn (2017) presented evidence
that personal intelligence predicted performance in person-centered courses—those in the
humanities and social sciences—better than thing-focused courses. Eight pairs of correlations
were computed over a main and a replication sample (Ns = 893 to 1063) between an intelligence
type (e.g., thing- or people-centered) that matched or mismatched grades in a course type (e.g.,
thing or people-focused). In each case, when the intelligence and course types matched, the
correlation was higher than when they mismatched. For example, personal intelligence correlated
more highly with courses in literature and philosophy than spatial intelligence did in both
samples; spatial intelligence correlated more highly with thing-focused courses than personal
intelligence did over both samples.
Specificty of Social Relationships. Both tests also appear to predict better interpersonal
relationships with others. People better like and respect individuals who have higher personal
and emotional intelligences than those with lower ability levels (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017;
Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008). Emotional intelligence relates to fewer depressive symptoms
and greater well-being (Fernádez-Berrocal & Extremera, 2016; Lopes, 2016; Mayer et al., 2008)
and higher personal intelligence may protect against symptoms of personality disorders (Mayer
et al., 2012).
Discussion
The Definition of Intelligence Revisited
At the outset of this chapter, I compared two definitions of intelligence—one that
emphasized general intelligence and the other that allowed for more consideration of broad,
content-focused intelligences. The identification of a group of broad intelligences argues for the
importance of content-specialization for at least some broad intelligences (others, such as mental
speededness, may be more general). I further argued that one key means of organizaing such
intelligences was into those focused on things, and those focused on people.
Too Many Intelligences? Yes and No
In a pair of influential commentaries, Hedlund and Sternberg (2000), and Austin and
Saklofski (2005) raised concerns that there were, perhaps, too many proposed intelligences to
accommodate in contemporary research: How, they wondered, would we manage an expansion
of the already large number of broad intelligences. One possible solution raised here is to arrange
broad intelligences according to key dimensions that distinguish them and help to define their
interrelationships.
Thing- and person-centered intelligences. Our focus here was on a person-thing
continuum: Indeed, people-centered intelligences appear to have predictable and distinct
predictions relative to thing-centered intelligences, such as the courses at which students may
excel (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017). But there may be other dimensions as well.
Basic versus subject-oriented broad intelligences. A possible second dimension that
could be added as an organizing continuum may be a basic, neurocognitive versus subjectfocused continua, in which the neurocognitive side is occupied by mental speededness, workingmemory and memory-retrieval, and the subject-focused end contains both the thing- and peopleoriented intelligences discussed here. It seems likely that the neurocognitive intelligences may be
more g- and fluid-intelligence related, whereas the thing- and person-centered intelligences may
reflect more crystallized intelligence.
Implications of Person-Centered Intelligences for Education
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Although intelligence levels are hard to change, education is highly effective at
improving a person’s functioning given the intelligence level people do possess. For example,
we are unlikely to improve people’s quantitative intelligence simply by teaching them algebra,
but teaching high school students how to organize their thinking about algebra and about the
already-worked-out ideas of the field is very effective at improving how well a student can solve
problems in the area. Most people won’t come up with the binomial or quadratic equations on
their own, but once taught them, can use the equations to solve algebraic problems. Similarly, by
guiding people to build and organize their knowledge around personality, we may improve their
effectiveness in thinking in the area.
A number of after-school programs seek to promote skills about human relationships by
teaching emotional knowledge, social understanding, and self-understanding more generally.
Although the curricula of these programs vary widely, and not all might meet the standards of
teaching their areas well, meta-analyses of social and emotional learning programs indicate that
teaching people about interpersonal relationships allows students to function better
interpersonally (and often academically) with substantial effect sizes in the range of .21 to .41
(Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor, & Schellinger, 2011). As we better specify the units and
operators of people-centered intelligences, we may be able to teach people these areas of study
more effectively.
Concluding Thoughts
Between 1905 to 1990 just a few measures of people-centered intelligences existed,
mostly of social intelligence, and research use of them had proven disappointing. As a
consequence, the new models of human mental abilities that emerged in the 1990s mostly
omitted their consideration. Now we have tests, data, and intriguing findings in the areas of both
personal and emotional intelligences. None of the tests in these new areas are perfect, but
collectively they indicate that intelligences about people exist and are consequential. The
research on people-centered intelligences has been eye-opening as to the importance of
reasoning about oneself and others. To succeed in life doesn’t depend just on “who you know” or
“what you know”, but also relies on “what you know about who you know.”
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